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1  Problem Statement
Over the past few years we have seen the use of Internet worms, i.e., 
malicious self-replicating programs, as a mechanism to rapidly invade 
and compromise large numbers of remote computers [SPW02]. Although 
the first worms released on the Internet were large-scale, easy-to-spot 
massive security incidents [MSB02, MPS+03, SM04, BCJ+05b], also 
known as flash worms [SMPW04], it is currently envisioned (and we see 
already see signs, in the wild) that future worms will be increasingly 
difficult to detect, and will be known as stealth worms. This may be 
partly because the motives of early worm developers are thought to have 
been centered around self-gratification brought by the achievement of 
compromising large numbers of remote computers, while the motives of 
recent worm and malware developers have progressed to more mundane 
(and sinister) financial and political gains. Therefore, although recent 
attackers still want to be able to control a large number of compromised 
computers, they prefer to compromise these computers as quietly as 
possible, over a longer period of time, so as to impede detection by 
current defense mechanisms. To achieve stealthy behavior, these 
attackers have started using, or at least have the capacity to use, a wide 
variety of mechanisms that will make their worms more difficult to 
detect. Such mechanisms might include: 
·Encryption: Attackers may communicate with the potential victim 
using a secure (encrypted) connection, making it difficult for network-
based Intrusion Detection Systems [Roe99, XCA +06] to spot their 
attempted attack. 
·Metamorphism: The body of worms usually contains some initial 
code that will be executed when the worm invades the victim 
computer. Metamorphism obfuscates this code by adding various 
instructions to it, and/or by substituting blocks of instructions with 
equivalent blocks of other instructions [SFOl]. In this way, two 
"copies" of the worm would appear to be completely different from 
each other, confusing worm detection systems that depend on all 
copies of a worm being practically identical [SEVS04, KK04, 
AAM05]. 
·Polymorphism: Polymorphic approaches obfuscate the worm's body 
by encoding it and prepending a decoder. When propagating, the worm 
mutates its body so that two "copies" of the worm would look 
completely different from each other (modulo the body of the encoder) 
[Szo05, DUMU03, K20l]. Much like metamorphic approaches, 
polymorphic systems confuse worm detection systems.
·Hit Lists: The first versions of recent worms selected their victims 
pseudo-randomly, i.e., by generating a random IP address in the range 
0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255. It has been proposed however, that worms 
may be more effective if they first create a hit-list of all vulnerable 
computers and then attack only computers in that hit-list [SPW02, 
AAMA05]. This hit-list may even be filtered to exclude honeypots1. 
Armed with a hit-list, a worm is able to compromise a number of 
vulnerable computers, while generating the minimum amount of traffic 
possible, limiting the effectiveness of defense mechanisms that detect 
visible traffic anomalies. 
·Hybrid Worms: Traditionally, worms have exploited vulnerabilities 
in applications and services open to Internet traffic. However, as more 
computers are located behind firewalls and NATs, they are 
theoretically protected from such types of attacks. Unfortunately, 
worm developers may exploit several different invasion paths 
11A honeypot is a computer waiting to be attacked. Once attacked, the honeypot 
records as much information as possible so that the administrators will be able 
to characterize the attack and possibly generate a signature for it.
including, infected email attachments, infected files shared through 
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, and infected files accessed through 
locally shared disks [KE03]. 
·Defense Mapping: Many of the proposed (and deployed) techniques 
for detecting and countering new attacks use honeypots as early-
warning systems [Spi03, DQG+04, YBP04, CBMM04, BCJ+05a, 
RMT05, MVSOl]. However, recent work has shown that attackers can 
exploit certain features and aspects of  honeypot behavior to identify 
and avoid such detectors [BFV05, SII05, RMT06]. Combined with hit-
lists, this can render worms (especially slow-spreading ones) and other 
automated attacks virtually undetectable. 
·Client-side Attacks: In the past few years (2005-2006) we have seen 
an increase in the use of zero-day attacks aimed at client software 
(especially browsers, but also various types of document viewers such 
as Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint, and Adobe Acrobat). Other 
than stand-alone, host-based intrusion detection/prevention 
mechanisms (such as virus scanners), very little has been done in 
hardening vulnerable client systems. 
1.1 Impact of failing to solve the problem
Compromised computers can be used to cause harm to third parties or 
even to cause harm to their traditional owners. 
·Attacks to third parties: Recent worm writers organize 
compromised computers into botnets, i.e., armies of hosts that are 
primarily used for malicious acts, including launching of Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks, blackmailing, sending of SPAM mail, click 
fraud, theft of intellectual property, and even identity theft. One would 
envision that botnets in the future could be used for political warfare 
purposes as well. 
·Attacks to the owners of compromised computers: A compromised 
computer can be used to steal private data and facilitate identity theft. 
Unfortunately, once ordinary users start to realize the dangers of a 
compromised computer, they will probably get increasingly less 
inclined to trust their computers for financial transactions or private 
communications. This will probably impede the adoption of an 
information society and may eventually reduce its overall spread and 
impact.
2  R e s e a r c h  D i r e c t i o n s
Over the last five years significant research has been conducted in the 
area of detection and containment of cyber-attacks. Indeed, we believe that 
we have currently reached the point where it is possible to readily detect 
one particular class of worms: rapidly spreading and massively parallel 
flash worms. However, it is unclear we have the technical knowledge or 
the deployed mechanisms in order to detect and contain stealth attacks. 
Using a combination of the techniques described earlier, such attacks can 
become invisible (or at least very difficult to detect) to network-based 
defenses. 
Our view is that such attacks can only be detected via large-scale 
collaboration among end-hosts: by exchanging and correlating relevant 
information, it is possible to identify stealthy attacks, and to take 
appropriate measures to defend against them, or at least quarantine those 
nodes that appear to have been compromised. Specifically, we believe that 
it is increasingly important to include home and small business computers 
in the attack-detection process. These computers are increasingly 
becoming the primary targets of most attackers. Therefore, including them 
in the worm- (or, more generally, attack-) detection process will increase 
the chances of attack detection. Exemplifying a large range of access 
patterns and a large range of applications, these computers typically tend 
to have more representative configurations than the traditional honeypots 
currently being used in worm detection. Furthermore, ordinary computers 
being used by their regular owners are more difficult to be categorized as 
honeypots and avoided by future attacks. The inclusion, however, of home 
computers in the detection process, should (1) guarantee the safety of the 
end computer and (2) the minimum possible intrusion in the ordinary use 
of the computer. Towards this direction, we propose two systems: 
Honey@home and Application Communities. We give a high-level 
description of both systems in the next two sections, both as concrete 
examples of collaborative defense mechanisms and to motivate further 
work in this direction.
On the other hand, we are not completely discounting network-based 
defenses: rather, we believe that such defenses must be integrated with 
end-host defenses. In the past, network and end-host security were viewed 
as two distinct areas that were meant to complement each other but kept 
separate. While this allowed for a clean separation between the respective 
security mechanisms, it also meant that the potential of both was stunted. 
Furthermore, by keeping them isolated, it was (and is) impossible to 
exploit scale for defensive purposes. Exploiting scale is something that 
attackers have learned to do well, as evidenced by such phenomena as 
distributed denial of service attacks, self-propagating worms, and botnets. 
The industry is beginning to follow such an approach, albeit in a 
fragmented, ad hoc fashion. For example, several enterprises exchange 
alert and IDS logs through sites such as DShield.org; anti-virus vendors 
with extensive presence on the desktop are correlating information about 
application behavior from thousands of hosts; network security and 
monitoring companies perform similar correlation using network traces 
and distributed black-holes (honeypots). To the extent that such 
approaches are being explored, they seem largely confined to the realm of 
information gathering. This also largely seems to be the situation with the 
US Department of Defense and the various intelligence agencies. For 
example, DARPA is currently funding the Application Communities effort, 
which seeks to leverage large software monocultures to distribute the task 
of attack monitoring - again, an approach confined to the end-host. 
Previous work (notably in the DARPA OASIS program) looked into the 
space of reactive security, but only considered small-scale environments. 
Arguably, we need to extend the reach of our collaboration-based 
mechanisms to counter such pervasive threats as DDoS and botnets. 
Thus, we argue that it is important to transition into an network 
architecture design where networks and end-hosts, in various 
combinations, can elect to collaborate and coordinate their actions and 
reactions to better protect themselves (and, by implication, the network at 
large). There are several research issues arising in such an environment, 
including: 
·What problems are best addressed through a collaborative approach;
·New mechanisms at all levels of the network architecture (routers, 
protocols, end-hosts, processes, hardware) that are "collaboration 
friendly";
·Metrics that quantify the security of collaborative approaches over 
non-collaborative approaches ;
·Who to trust, and to what extend;
·How to prevent attacks that exploit such mechanisms, including 
insider threats;
·Command-and-control vs. loose-coupling mechanism composition.
Furthermore, in an era of distributed software services (what is 
fashionably called "Web 2.0"), no single application, node, or network has 
enough information to detect and counter high-level semantic attacks, or 
even some of the more conventional web-based malware (e.g., cross-site 
scripting attacks). Large-scale distributed systems require large-scale 
distributed defenses. This is particularly true within specific application 
domains (such as health care and industrial SCADA control), where large-
scale collaborative (but independent) defenses will allow better control to 
critical information and resources. 
3 Honey@home
    Traditional honeypot architectures are based on monitoring unused IP 
addresses located at specific institutes and organizations [CBMM04]. This 
unused IP address space, also called “dark space”, is easy to identify and 
thus be blacklisted by attackers [BFV05]. Furthermore, all honeypot tech-
nologies rely on the size of the dark space in order to be effective; the 
more dark space is used, the faster and more accurate the results obtained. 
To overcome these two problems, Honey@home [AAM07] empowers or-
dinary users and organizations, institutes and enterprises, who are not fa-
miliar with honeypot technologies, to contribute their dark space to a net-
work of affined honeypots. Many public bodies, universities and even 
home users do not use all the address space they possess. They also do not 
have the expertise to setup and maintain a honeypot to monitor that unused 
space. Honey@home fills that gap by installing a virtual honeypot to the 
machine(s) of unfamiliar users. Several other “@home”  approaches, like 
Seti@home and Folding@home, have shown that users can contribute sig-
nificantly towards a common goal. 
      Honey@home is designed to be used by people unfamiliar with 
honeypot technologies. From the user perspective, no configuration is 
needed. Honey@home is a cross-platform tool that requires minimal 
resources and can run unsupervised at the background, just like modern 
messengers. Its basic functionality is to claim an unused IP address 
through the DHCP server of the local network it is installed on and 
forward all the traffic going to that address to a centralized farm of 
honeypots. The centralized farm runs multiple services/applications, and 
processes all the traffic received from Honey@home clients. Central 
honeypots will provide answers to the received traffic and send them back 
to the Honey@home clients. From their side, Honey@home clients will 
send the responses from honeypots back to the originators of the attack. 
The attacker is under the impression that she communicates with the 
address claimed by Honey@home client, but in reality she communicates 
with a central honeypot that gathers, analyzes, and responds to her attacks 
and probes. More advanced users can manually declare their dark space 
and contribute more than one unused IP address. The centralized farm is 
implemented by a number of Argos [PSB06] honeypots that are able to 
catch previously unknown attack vectors.
    Honey@home enables the creation of an infrastructure where the 
monitored dark space is distributed over the network and can become 
arbitrarily large, depending on the number of Honey@home clients. 
Although the idea of forwarding traffic destined for an unused IP address 
to a centralized farm of honeypots may sound simple, there are several 
challenges behind the Honey@home approach. First, participating clients 
should be undetectable. If an attacker can easily determine whether an 
address is monitored by Honey@home, clients can be blacklisted and not 
contribute to the overall infrastructure. (Note, however, that this could be 
turned into a defensive advantage by acting as a deterrent.) Second, central 
honeypots must be hidden so that they cannot be remotely exploited or 
otherwise attacked. Finally, the installation of mock clients that will 
overload the central honeypots with nonsense traffic must be prevented. 
Honey@home tries to deal with these challenges by employing various 
techniques, like anonymization networks [Tor03] to hide honeypots and a 
registration process to prevent massive automatic installation of fake 
clients.  
4 Application Communities
    An Application Community (AC) is a collection of congruent instances 
of the same application running autonomously on end-hosts distributed 
across a wide-area network, whose members cooperate in identifying 
previously unknown flaws/attacks [AC06]. By exchanging information, the 
AC members may be able to prevent the failure from manifesting in the 
future. Although individual members may be susceptible to new failures, 
the AC should eventually converge into a state of immunity against a 
particular fault, adding a dimension of learning and adaptation to the 
system. An AC may be considered a “virtual honeypot”  composed of many 
machines/applications that are in actual use (i.e., they are not passive, non-
guided entities as traditional honeypots are); AC members contribute a 
share of their resources (such as CPU cycles) towards the processing done 
by this virtual honeypot. By using real applications and systems as 
detectors, Application Communities can identify targeted attacks, attacks 
that exploit specific state, or attacks that require user action (e.g., for client 
applications such as web browsers). The size of the AC, in terms of 
number of participating nodes, impacts  coverage (in detecting faults) and 
fairness (in distributing the monitoring task) [ASA05]. An AC is composed 
of three main mechanisms, for monitoring, communication, and defense, 
respectively.
    The purpose of the monitoring mechanism is the detection of 
previously unknown (“zero day”) software failures. There exists a plethora 
of work in this area, namely, using the compiler to insert run-time safety 
checks,”sandboxing”, anomaly detection, and content-based filtering [2]. 
While shortcomings may be attributed to each of the approaches, when 
they are considered within the scope of an AC a different set of 
considerations need to be examined. Specifically, the significance of the 
security vs. performance tradeoff is de-escalated with respect to the ability 
to efficiently employ the mechanism in a distributed fashion. The 
advantage of utilizing an AC is that the use of a fairly invasive mechanism 
(in terms of performance) may be acceptable, since the associated cost can 
be distributed to the participating members. By employing a more invasive 
instrumentation technique, the likelihood of detecting subversion and 
identifying the source of the vulnerability is increased. The monitoring 
mechanism in our prototype is an instruction-level emulator that can be 
selectively invoked for arbitrary segments of code, allowing us to mix 
emulated and non-emulated execution inside the same execution context 
[STEM05], although other mechanisms can be used instead (or in addition) 
[SGK05].
    Once a failure is detected by a member’s monitoring component, the 
relevant information is distributed across the AC. Specifically, the purpose 
of the communication component is the dissemination of information 
pertaining to the discovery of new failures and the distribution of the 
monitoring work load within the AC. The choice of the communication 
model to be employed by an AC is subject to the characteristics of the 
collaborating community, such as size and flexibility. The immediate trade-
off associated with the communication model is the overhead in messages 
versus the latency of the information in the AC. In the simplest case, a 
centralized approach is arguably the most efficient communication 
mechanism. However, there are a number of scalability and trust issues 
associated with this approach. If there is a fixed number of collaborating 
nodes, a secure structured overlay network can be employed, with 
exemption from the problems associated with voluminous joins and leaves. 
If nodes enter and leave the AC at will, a decentralized approach may be 
more appropriate. Efficient dissemination of messages is outside the scope 
of this paper, but has been the topic of much research in the networking 
community.
    The immunizing component of our architecture is responsible for 
protecting the AC against  future instances of a specific failure. Ideally, 
upon receiving notification of a failure observed by another AC member, 
individual members independently confirm the validity of the reported 
weakness and create their own fix in a decentralized manner. At that point, 
each member in the AC decides autonomously what fix to apply in order to 
inoculate itself. As independent verification of an attack report may be 
impossible in some situations, a member’s action may depend on 
predefined trust metrics (e.g., trusted verifications servers). Depending on 
the level of trust among users, alternative mechanisms may be employed 
for the adoption of universal fixes and verification of attack reports. In the 
case of systems where there is minimal trust among members a voting 
system can be employed at the cost of an increased communication 
overhead. Finally, given that a fix could be universally adopted by the AC, 
special care must be placed in minimizing the performance implications of 
the immunization.
    The inoculating approach that can be employed by the AC is contingent 
on the nature of the detection mechanism and the subsequent information 
provided on the specific failure. The type of protection can range from 
statistical blocking, behavioral or structural transformation. For example, 
IP address and content filtering, code randomization [KKP03], adaptive 
defenses [SGK05], and emulation [STEM05] may be used for the 
protection of the AC members.
5  Conclusions
    We have argued that the Internet-borne cyber-attacks of the future re-
quire collaborative solutions that encompass (and perhaps focus) on end-
hosts, rather than depend on network-based defenses. We have briefly de-
scribed two such research thrusts, Honey@home [AAM07] and Applica-
tion Communities [AC06]. Although there are many research challenges 
(and opportunities) ahead, we believe that large-scale collaborative de-
fenses hold the key to a future secure Internet. 
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